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Case Management Considerations
In 1978 the area of Love Canal, New York, became a focal point
of media attention. The homes and schools of Love Canal, it was
discovered, had been built on land contaminated by hazardous
wastes and residents of the area were suffering from debilitating ill-
nesses due to exposure to the wastes. Publicity of this specter of
disease provoked widespread concern regarding the existence of
other toxic waste disposal sites and the effects of hazardous wastes
on health and the environment. The most significant legislative re-
sponse to these concerns was the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or
"Superfund").
CERCLA requires cleanup of toxic waste sites but fails to address
the needs of individuals who incur damages due to exposure to
wastes. Several bills, therefore, have been introduced that would
amend CERCLA to provide a federal cause of action for damages
resulting from the disposal of hazardous substances.2 One such
proposal,3 introduced in the 98th Congress, would permit injured
individuals to seek compensation for medical and rehabilitation
costs, lost income, pain and suffering, and economic loss to their
property. Past and present owners or operators of disposal sites,
and generators and transporters of waste, could be sued and held
strictly, jointly and severally liable for injuries resulting from their
activities. Furthermore, they could assert only three narrow de-
fenses.4 A similar amendment was recently introduced in the Senate
for consideration by the 99th Congress. 5
1. 42 U.S.C. § § 9601-9657 (1982). See Macbeth & Mayer, An Introduction to
Superfund, 30 PRAC. LAw. 53, 54 (1984).
2. See, e.g., S. 917, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 946, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983);
S. 945, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2482, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); and H.R.
5640, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H8847-48 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1984)(Title II
of "The Superfund Expansion and Protection Act of 1984").
3. H.R. 5640, supra note 2. The House of Representatives voted to strike Title II
(the federal cause of action) from the bill by a vote of 208 to 200. See id. at H8854-55.
4. Liability could be avoided under H.R. 5640 only if the damages resulted from an
act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of certain third parties if the defendant
established by a preponderance of the evidence that he exercised due care and took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of those parties. H.R. 5640, supra note
2, at H8848 (§ 202(b)(3)).
5. S. 51 provides a federal cause of action and differs from H.R. 5640 with respect to
the standard of liability (strict but not joint and several). The defenses are the same as
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Two principal reasons are advanced in support of a federal cause
of action for mass torts.6 First, state tort law is thought to be an
inadequate mechanism to redress the injuries that result from expo-
sure to hazardous substances. 7 These injuries often do not manifest
themselves until years after the statute of limitations has run. More-
over, scientists have been unable to establish a causal relationship
between the exposure and the injuries that satisfies the require-
ments of traditional tort law.8 In addition, mass tort actions are typ-
are the compensable damages. In addition, S. 51 specifically allows for punitive dam-
ages in certain circumstances. Moreover, S. 51 delineates the kinds of evidence that
shall be admissible and explicitly states that "it is the policy of Congress to encourage
certification of class actions" in suits brought pursuant to the federal cause of action. S.
51, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S361 (daily ed.Jan. 3, 1985)(Amendment No.
3).
6. The term "mass tort" can be used to describe two different types of litigation.
The first, mass accident litigation, usually arises following a single catastrophic event in
which many individuals are immediately injured or killed. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disas-
ter at Florida Everglades, 549 F. 2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Federal Skywalk Cases,
95 F.R.D. 479 (W.D. Mo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). The second, mass products
liability litigation, also concerns the injuries of numerous individuals, though not those
resulting from a specific one-time occurrence. Rather, the latter usually arises when
many persons have been exposed over time to a harmful product that may have been
produced by a number of manufacturers. "Toxic tort" litigation and "mass exposure"
litigation are probably best included in the latter category. Such actions typically involve
multiple exposures to hazardous substances or harmful drugs such as dioxin, DDT, as-
bestos, DES or the "Dalkon Shield" intrauterine devices. See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly Co.,
84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979)(DES); In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield"
I.U.D. Products Liability Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and re-
manded, 693 F. 2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Dalkon Shield Litigation]; In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 100
F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984)[hereinafter cited as Agent
Orange H ].
7. See generally Note, Hazardous Waste Disposal: Is There Still a Role for Common Law? 18
TULSA L.J. 448 (1983); Seltzer, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposalfor Tort
Reform, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 797 (1982-1983); Note, Common Law and the Toxic
Tort: Where Does Superfund Leave the Private Victim of Toxic Torts?, 86 DICK. L. REV. 725
(1982); Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies for Hazardous Waste Injuries,
12 RUTGERS L. REV. 117 (1980); Note, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom
Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (1981).
8. Proof of causation is perhaps the greatest obstacle to recovery in mass products
liability litigation (including "toxic tort" and "mass exposure" litigation). The products
and substances involved in such suits are often produced by several manufacturers and
there may be a resultant problem of tracing the injury to a specific defendant. Moreover,
the plaintiffs' injuries often cannot be causally linked with sufficient certainty to the
product at issue. An individual suffering from leukemia, for instance, may well have con-
tracted the disease from chemicals in the groundwater. He may, however, be ill for a
number of other reasons, including hereditary tendencies or poor dietary habits. A fed-
eral cause of action cannot itself overcome the causation barrier, although the law could
be written so as to alleviate the problem. For example, the traditional causation stan-
dard could be relaxed or altered. In addition, a broadening of the evidentiary rules
could help the plaintiff in proving causation. Currently, courts deem much of the evi-
dence tending to show a causal relationship betwen injuries and exposure to certain
substances to be unreliable and therefore inadmissible at trial. See S. 51, supra note 5, at
§ 124(c) (relevant evidence that is admissible in actions for damages under the federal
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ified by delay, expense and unequal distributions of legal resources
between victims and defendants. 9
Second, many proponents of a federal cause of action believe that
compensation of toxic tort victims is better achieved through private
law adjudication of claims rather than through administrative mech-
anisms similar to the Federal Black Lung program.' 0 They reason
that adjudication is superior because victims receive their "day in
court""I and risk-takers are better deterred from engaging in unac-
ceptably dangerous activities in the future.' 2
This Comment offers a third-and previously unconsidered-rea-
son for the adoption of a federal cause of action for damages result-
ing from the disposal of toxic substances: A federal cause of action
will facilitate more efficient case management of toxic tort litigation.
Such actions are particularly difficult to manage because they often
involve many victims, several defendants and the laws of more than
cause of action is specified and includes epidemiological studies, animal studies, short-
term in vitro studies, and tissue and toxicological studies). For more complete consider-
ations of the causation problems in mass products liability litigation, see generally
Delgado, Beyond "Sindell" Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintifls, 70
CAL. L. REV. 881 (1982); Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An
Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law:
Reflections on the "DES" Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1982); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection
in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851
(1984); Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980).
9. Defendants in these actions are generally capable of pooling their resources to
present a unified and powerful defense. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are often barred
by jurisdictional barriers from obtaining economies of scale.
10. Part B of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 created a black
lung claims system. This was amended in 1972, 1978 and again in 1981. The 1978
amendments substantially eased the burden of claimants and, as a result, the Social Se-
curity Administration in that year had an 81 percent approval rate of claims. Eighty-
eight percent of those were reportedly "not based on adequate medical evidence." The
1981 amendments were designed to counteract the negative results of the 1978 amend-
ments and significantly tightened the eligibility formula for claims filed after January 1,
1982. See Logatto, The Federal Black Lung Program: A 1983 Primer, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 677,
693-694 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 927-928 ("There is value in affording victims
an opportunity to initiate claims. . . .[Tihe tort system provides a greater sense of rep-
resentation than is usually possible in agency rulemaking or even adjudicatory proceed-
ings."); Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights-Part 1, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172-1175 (access to courts for redress of injury
contributes to dignity of injured and sense of participation in community).
12. Cf Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 855 ("[M]ass exposure torts are frequently prod-
ucts of the deliberate policies of businesses that tailor safety investments to profit mar-
gins. Such risk-taking policies should be especially amenable to control through threats
of liability."); id. at 927; Corash, Evaluating the Effects of Alternative Compensation Systems, 14
ENVTL. L. REP. 10121, 10122 (1984) ( "I believe . ..that the tort system is truly con-
duct-affecting in a way that a fund or a system which does not allocate blame to those
who are in fact responsible and whose conduct caused the injury is not and cannot be.").
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one jurisdiction. ' 3
Additionally, this Comment suggests that Congress recommend
the extensive use of class actions in such federal litigation.' 4 Class
treatment could be the most efficacious case management tool. Fur-
thermore, the class mechanism could allow victims to benefit from
economies of scale in prosecuting their cases and could provide a
vehicle for making small claim actions-that are unmarketable
under existing mechanisms-marketable to the plaintiffs bar.' 5
I. Case Management and the Federal Cause of Action
All civil suits in the U.S. district courts are governed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 provides that the Rules "shall
be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action." This goal has become increasingly difficult to
achieve as the dockets of the federal courts have become more
crowded. The presence of mass tort suits has only exacerbated the
backlog.' 6 Consequently, increasing attention has been paid by
both plaintiff and defense attorneys to developing case management
techniques for streamlining legal procedures and thereby lowering
the costs of litigation.' 7
Some commentators have noted a trend away from litigation in-
volving the private rights and duties of two individual parties and
13. See, e.g., Snyder v. Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 735, 429
N.Y.S. 2d 153 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (noting that 1254 claimants had brought actions); Cloud
v. Olin Corp., 552 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (1100 plaintiffs); In re "Agent Orange"
Products Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (Agent Orange I), modified,
100. F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984) (multiple chemical
company defendants and thousands, perhaps millions, of plaintiffs).
14. See S. 51, supra note 5, at § 124(d) ("It is the policy of the Congress to encourage
certification of class actions in actions under [the federal cause of action] involving com-
mon issues of fact or law. In furtherance of that policy, the Congress finds that the
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are met in actions
under such [federal cause of action] arising from the same release and presenting com-
mon issues of fact or law and involving thirty or more potential claimants.").
15. Cf Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 908-909 ("By aggregating mass exposure claims,
class actions could enable mass exposure victims to litigate both in the numbers and
with the adversarial strength necessary .. ").
16. There was a 17 percent increase in the filing of products liability suits in the
federal district courts between 1980 and 1981 with over 9000 new products liability suits
filed. See 1981 AD. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 218 (1982).
17. This comment specifically discusses three procedural devices in terms of their
increased effectiveness as case management tools under the federal cause of action-
multidistrict litigation, Rule 42 consolidation and bifurcation, and Rule 23 class actions.
Other procedural devices used as case management tools include: test cases used in
conjunction with collateral estoppel, see Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242
(E.D. Tex. 1980); and special masters and magistrates, see Hazard & RiceJudicial Man-
agement of Pretrial Process in Massive Litigation: Special Masters as Case Managers, 1982 A. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 375.
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toward litigation designed to "further the collective interests of soci-
ety." 8  Professor Abram Chayes originated the term "public law
litigation" to describe actions of the latter variety. "Public law" liti-
gation is characterized by "sprawling and amorphous" party struc-
tures, and an adversary relationship "suffused and intermixed with
negotiating and mediating processes." 19 In addition, it is "often ex-
traordinarily complex and extended in time." 20 This litigation,
therefore, requires effective case management if its "just, speedy
and inexpensive determination" is to be secured.
Toxic tort litigation generally satisfies Chayes' paradigm for
"public law" litigation. The consequences of exposure to toxic sub-
stances are seldom limited to a discrete plaintiff class. Moreover,
society's interest in maximum deterrence requires that manufactur-
ers be held fully accountable for the injuries inflicted by hazardous
wastes. Leakage from a single dump site can produce hundreds,
even thousands, of injuries of various kinds and degrees of severity.
The accident may implicate many generators and transporters of
waste as well as several past and present owners and operators of
the disposal site. Litigation will be complex and prolonged not only
because of the many parties involved, but also because of the ex-
tended latency periods of the injuries and the complex and often
inconclusive evidence regarding the effects of toxic agents on health
and the environment.
These actions are likely to multiply as the disposal of toxic wastes
generates additional media attention and scientific investigation, as
more sites are discovered and created and as latent injuries begin to
manifest themselves. 21 Richard Willard, the Chief of the Justice De-
partment's Civil Division, estimated in 1984 that "toxic tort claims
against the Federal Government over the next ten years, excluding
asbestos claims, will top $200 billion." 22 A federal cause of action
may remove some of the barriers to effective management of cases
that arise following exposure to toxic wastes and thus promote the
18. McGovern, Management of Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affect-
ing Case Management, 19 FORUM 1, 5 (1983).
19. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284
(1976).
20. Id. at 1298.
21. Cf Lauter, Footing the Bill for Toxic Torts, Nat'l L. J., Jan. 31, 1983, at 1, 40.
(" 'There is going to be a lot of activity in the toxic tort area whether Congress acts or
not. ").
22. Recovery for Exposure to Hazardous Substances: The Superfund § 301(e) Study and Be-
yond, 14 ENVrL. L. REP. 10098 (1984). Many of these claims would not be covered by the
proposed legislation.
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just and efficient resolution of these suits that otherwise threaten to
overwhelm the courts.
A. Multidistrict Litigation
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is empowered to
transfer related civil actions pending in different district courts to a
single district for coordination and consolidation of pretrial pro-
ceedings, provided the actions "involv[e] one or more common
questions of fact." 23 For example, in a products liability action in-
volving the "Dalkon Shield" intrauterine device, the Panel trans-
ferred fifty-seven actions pending in twenty-three different districts
to the centrally located district of Kansas.24 The seven-judge Panel
may deny transfer, however, if it determines that many factual ques-
tions unique to each action predominate over common questions.2 5
Technically, these actions must be remanded to the courts from
which they were transferred following the pretrial proceedings.2 6
Therefore, the benefits of consolidation would appear to be limited
to discovery and, perhaps, settlement negotiations. Most actions
are not in fact remanded, however, but instead are retained for trial
by the judge to whom they were transferred. 27 The transferee judge
also has the authority to vacate, modify or expand prior orders of
the original courts and to decide all pretrial motions, including
those that are dispositive of the actions.28 Consequently, there is
concern that the parties may be disadvantaged because substantial
portions of their case may be litigated outside their chosen forum.
A second problem associated with multidistrict litigation results
from the requirement that transferee judges apply the substantive
laws of the various districts in which the actions originated. 29 This
may cause the case to be delayed while the judge determines which
states' laws to apply to which aspects of the consolidated case. In
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982).
24. In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc. "Dalkon Shield" I.U.D. Products Liability Litigation,
406 F.Supp. 540 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
25. See, e.g., In re Rely Tampon Products Liability Litigation, 533 F.Supp. 1346
(J.P.M.D.L. 1982).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982).
27. The transferee judge has the power to order transfer of the actions for trial pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or § 1406. See Weigal, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 583 (1977); In re Bendec-
tin Products Liability Litigation, 102 F.R.D. 239 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
28. The transferee court may determine motions for judgment approving a settle-
ment, for dismissal, for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment. See
Weigal, supra note 27, at 583.
29. Id. at 584.
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addition, transferee judges must invest a great deal of time in ac-
quainting themselves with the substantive laws of foreign jurisdic-
tions. A federal cause of action would overcome most of these
choice of law problems. Variations in state substantive law would
become irrelevant.30 A federal cause of action that clearly specified
the potentially liable parties, the compensable damages, and the
available defenses 31 would curtail the transferee judge's discretion
and mitigate the parties' concern about transfer out of the original
forum. In addition, a single federal standard might encourage more
Panel findings that unique factual questions do not predominate
over common questions and thus more orders of transfer for pre-
trial consolidation.
B. Rule 42 Consolidation and Bifurcation
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows federal dis-
trict courts to order joint hearings or trials of actions pending
before them that involve "a common question of law or fact." 32
Judges have been urged to consolidate such cases "in order to expe-
dite the trial and eliminate unnecessary repetition and confusion." 33
The courts may order consolidation despite opposition from the
parties. They may also "order a separate trial of any claim.., or
issu[e]" for reasons of convenience, efficiency, or avoidance of
prejudice. 34
Rule 42 consolidation has been increasingly used by federal trial
judges as a means of managing multiparty tort litigation.35 Courts
have consolidated mass plaintiff accident actions involving a single
defendant3 6 and mass plaintiff products liability actions involving
one or more manufacturers of an allegedly harmful drug or sub-
30. This comment recommends that the federal cause of action be exclusive and
preempt any contrary state law. Such preemption would provide uniformity and pre-
dictability as to future conduct as well as eliminate the choice of law problems in mul-
tidistrict litigation. Cf The Superfund Improvements Act of 1984, H.R. 5640: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Statement of George C. Freeman, Jr.).
31. See, e.g., H.R. 5640, supra note 3 and accompanying text; S. 51, supra note 5.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
33. Dupont v. Southern Pacific Co., 366 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 958 (1967).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
35. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 549 F. 2d 1006 (5th Cir.
1977); Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 415 F. 2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1969); In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 479 (W.D. Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); In re
Three-Mile Island Litigation, 95 F.R.D. 164 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
36. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 549 F. 2d 1006 (5th Cir.
1977); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 479 (W.D. Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
988 (1982).
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stance.3 7 The consolidation of actions for trial assures a single uni-
form determination of the common issues that is binding on all
parties.38 Thus, dockets are cleared of duplicative suits. In addi-
tion, more actions are settled before trial because any uncertainty as
to the application of any judgment obtained on the common issues
has been eliminated.39
Courts have also found that some cases involving multiple plain-
tiffs or defendants can be disposed of efficiently by bifurcating the
trial on certain outcome-determinative issues. For example, the
statute of limitations defense40 may be tried before the liability is-
sues. Or a trial on the issue of causation may be held before the trial
on all other issues raised by the suit.41 The outcome of the first trial
may encourage settlement before the follow-up trials or may elimi-
nate the need for future trials altogether. Of course, bifurcation
may also lead to greater congestion of the courts if used indiscrimi-
nately. Therefore, "[a] trial judge should try issues separately only
when separation aids expedition and economy." 42
Rule 42 consolidation was designed to provide the courts a means
of managing their dockets to obtain "trial convenience and
economy in administration."-43 A federal cause of action for dam-
ages resulting from toxic waste disposal would provide greater op-
portunities for courts to consolidate related actions under the Rule.
These suits would then have the question of federal law, including
the specified liability and defenses, in common.
C. Class Actions
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows trial judges
to certify classes of plaintiffs or defendants if the number of people
involved is so large that it would be impracticable to join each indi-
vidual as a party to the suit. There must, however, be questions of
law or fact common to the class. The Rule also requires that the
37. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979).
38. See Plaintiffs' Case Management Proposal at 17, Cloud v. Olin, No. CV79-M-
5128-NE (N.D. Ala.), reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGA-
TION 795, 811 (1984).
39. Id. at 819. See also In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 549 F. 2d 1006
(5th Cir. 1977)(consolidated mass accident action settled shortly before trial).
40. See, e.g., Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 927 (1981); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (citing 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2389 (1971)).
41. See, e.g, In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 2090 (1983).
42. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979).
43. MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958).
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class representatives present claims or defenses that are typical of
the class and that they "fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class." 44 Section (d) of the Rule grants the courts broad mana-
gerial powers to "make appropriate orders . . . determining the
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue
repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argu-
ment."' 45 Additionally, the courts have discretionary authority to bi-
furcate the class action with respect to particular issues and
subclasses. 46
Class actions could be extremely useful to courts in managing
mass tort cases. 47 The single determination of an issue could be
made binding on all class members, not only the present litigants
but also persons whose injuries have not yet manifested themselves.
Class actions could therefore prevent duplicative trials and inconsis-
tent results.
Class treatment could also be the fairest means of managing these
suits. In some cases class certification could protect defendants
from the possibility of insolvency resulting from meeting multiple
claims against them.48 In addition, if mass tort classes were certified
under section (b)(3) of Rule 23, all readily ascertainable members of
the class would be notified of the action and given the opportunity
to opt out and thereby be excluded from the judgment.49 The noti-
fication provision could alert potential plaintiffs of their legal rights
and the opt-out provision could allow members of the class to liti-
gate their cases individually. Furthermore, certification of a plaintiff
class could equalize the bargaining power of the plaintiffs and de-
fendants. The aggregation of claims and resources, moreover,
could result in the compensation of small claimants who might
otherwise be precluded from bringing suit. 50
44. FED R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
47. For views by commentators who have advocated the use of class actions for mass
tort litigation, see generally Rosenberg, supra note 8; McGovern, supra note 18; Wil-
liams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323 (1982); Note, Federal Mass
Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47 Alb. L. Rev. 1180 (1983); Wright &
Collusi, The Successful Use of the Class Action Device in the Management of the "Skywalk " Mass
Tort Litigation, 52 UMKC L. REV. 141 (1984).
48. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
49. Rule 23(c)(2) provides that "in any class action maintained under subdivision
(b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable. ...
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if
he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will in-
clude all members who do not request exclusion.
50. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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Courts, however, have seldom allowed class treatment of mass
tort cases. 5 1  This reluctance may be due, in part, to the Advisory
Committee's comment that a "mass accident" is "ordinarily not ap-
propriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liabil-
ity, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways." 5 2
Other commentators, however, have suggested that the mass acci-
dent is "peculiarly appropriate for class treatment." 53 They argue
that such actions are likely to involve complex questions requiring
expert testimony that need not be repeated "time and time
again."5 4 Moreover, the defense and liability issues may be as uni-
form in mass tort cases as in the many securities and antitrust cases
that are routinely treated as class actions. 55
Few courts have specifically referred to the Advisory Committee's
admonition when denying mass tort class certification. Rather,
courts have denied such certification on the ground that the parties
failed to meet the prerequisites of Rule 23. These include the four
above-mentioned conditions that joinder be impracticable, common
questions of law or fact be present and the class representatives
present typical claims and protect the interests of the class as a
whole. A class action may be maintained only if one of the following
tests is also satisfied: (1) separate actions would create a risk of in-
compatible standards of conduct for the defendant, or individual de-
terminations would impair or impede or be dispositive of the
interests of other members not parties; (2) injunctive relief is appro-
51. See, e.g., McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. United States District Court, 523 F.2d
1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976) (mass accident); Hobbs v. North-
east Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (mass accident); Dalkon Shield Litigation,
526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). Ruland v. General Electric Company, 94 F.R.D. 164
(D. Conn. 1982) (PCBs); Ryan v. Eli Lilly Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979) (DES); Yan-
die v. PPG Industries Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (asbestos).
52. 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966); See, e.g., Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F.Supp. 1337, 1343
(E.D. Pa. 1972) ("[w]e have found the notes of the Advisory Committee to Rule 23 .. .
instructive."), aff'd. on other grounds, 483 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 946
(1974); Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Co., 85 F.R.D. 100, 110-11 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re
Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting, but finding
inapplicable, the "general rule" of the Advisory Committee), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1417
(1984).
53. 3B J. MOORE &J. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.45[3] at 23-353 n.
40 (2d ed. 1984); see also, 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, § 1783 at 117 (1972) ("The argument for class action treatment is particu-
larly strong in cases arising out of mass disasters. ")[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
MILLER].
54. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 53, at 117. See also, Note, Federal Mass Tort Class
Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, supra note 47, at 1182.
55. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 53, at 117.
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priate to the entire class; or (3) common questions of law or fact
predominate over questions affecting individual members and a
class action is the superior method for the "fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of the controversy. ' 5 6 Mass tort cases would be most appro-
priately certified as 23(b)(3) class actions and therefore would have
to meet the requirements of the final category.57
Courts have typically refused to grant 23(b)(3) class certification
for victims of mass torts although to do so could promote efficient,
economical and consistent adjudication of their claims. 58 The re-
quirement that "questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members" has generally been the major obstacle to certification.
Courts have thus denied class certification on the ground that the
liability issue is too entangled with injury and causation issues
unique to each plaintiff.59 Or they have held that the interests of the
parties in controlling their individual cases override any interests in
the "fair and efficient adjudication" that would be served by class
certification. 60 In addition, courts have found that common issues
do not predominate in cases that involve the different laws of a
number of jurisdictions. 6 1
Nevertheless, a few federal trial courts have used the class action
to manage mass tort litigation. 62 These courts have recognized the
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
57. Because the plaintiffs in such litigation typically seek damages rather than injunc-
tive relief, 23(b)(2) is generally inapplicable. Members of both a 23(b)(2) and a 23(b)(1)
class are bound by the judgment whether they are aware of the action or not because
Rule 23(c)(2) provides that "the judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class." Therefore, use of
Rule 23(b)(3), whereby members are allowed to opt out of the action, is perceived to be
fairer to class members and more likely to alert potential plaintiffs of their legal rights.
58. See, e.g., supra note 51.
59. See, e.g., Dalkon Shield Litigation, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) (vacating nation-
wide punitive damage class and California liability class), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817
(1983); Delaney v. Borden, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (formaldehyde); Ryan v.
Eli Lilly, 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979); Yandle v. PPG Industries, 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D.
Tex. 1974) (asbestos). See also, Williams, supra note 47, at 330; Seltzer, Punitive Damages in
Mass Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (1983).
60. See, e.g., Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd on other
grounds, 483 F. 2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 946 (1974); Hobbs v. North-
east Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
61. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76 (E. Pa. 1970); Comment, Mass
Accident Class Actions, 60 U. CAL. L. REV. 1615, 1622-23, 1638 (1972).
62. See, e.g., Agent Orange H, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1417 (1984) (certifying class for all issues under Rule 23(b)(3) and on issues of punitive
damages under Rule 23(b)(l)(B)); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D.
Mo.) (certifying Rule 23(b)(l)(A) class on issues of liability for compensatory and puni-
tive damages and a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on issues of liability for and amount of punitive
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usefulness of Rule 23(b)(3) in efficiently disposing of mass tort
cases. They have made flexible and innovative use of their powers
under 23(c)(4) to certify classes as to particular issues and to divide
classes into subclasses. Thus, "an apparently unmanageable class
action could be converted to a manageable one" because the courts
have the flexibility to "treat common things in common and to dis-
tinguish the distinguishable. ' 63 Because the trial on the common
issues binds the class members, the jury in each subsequent trial will
only be responsible for determining unique issues. The successive
trials, therefore, will correspondingly be shortened by the amount
of time spent on the trial of the common issues. 64 Thus, the deter-
minations of the actions could be more speedily and inexpensively
secured. 65
Some commentators and trial judges have also found that class
certification under 23(b)(1) rather than 23(b)(3) may be advanta-
geous on the separate issue of punitive damages. 66 Members of a
23(b)(1) class may not opt out of the class and thereafter bring a
separate action. 67 This "mandatory" class treatment will preclude
repeated litigation on the issue of punitive damages. Moreover, de-
fendants with finite assets will be protected from possible insol-
vency and the plaintiffs will have equal priority in their claims to the
damages), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), on remand, 95 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(certifying class under Rule 23(b)(3) on issues of compensatory and punitive damage
liability and amount of punitive damages), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982);
23(b)(l)(B)); Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Co., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980) (certifying six
subclasses under Rule 23(b)(3); subsequently abandoned for lack of adequate represen-
tation). See also Millet v. Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, 428 So. 2d 1075
(La. Ct. App.) (applying state analog of Rule 23(b)(3)), cert. denied, 433 So. 2d 153
(1983).
63. Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Co., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980), quotingJenkins v.
United Gas Corp., 400 F. 2d 28, 35 (5th Cir. 1968).
64. See Williams, supra note 47, at 328.
65. The primary obstacle to 23(b)(3) certification of mass tort classes is the predomi-
nance of uniquely individual causation questions. See supra note 8. A federal cause of
action will not eliminate the presence of individual causation questions. The require-
ment of Rule 23(b)(3) that common questions of law or fact predominate over questions
affecting individual members, however, may be more easily met under a federal cause of
action. To the extent the federal cause of action would increase the overall number of
common questions (such as statute of limitations, rule of liability, and defenses), courts
might be more willing to find that common questions do predominate over the individual
causation questions. Moreover, specification of a clear congressional intent that it is the
policy of the Congress to encourage class certification of these suits, see supra note 14,
when read in conjunction with the federal cause of action may lead to increased willing-
ness to grant class certification of mass plaintiff classes.
66. Cf Seltzer, supra note 59; Agent Orange II, 100 F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188
(8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
67. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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defendants' limited funds. 68
Class treatment of toxic tort actions not only benefits the courts in
effectively managing these suits but also tends to promote the fair
adjudication of the actions. Plaintiffs in mass tort litigation often
face practical barriers to recovery. Individually they are often unable
to engage in the discovery and trial techniques needed to overcome
preponderance of the evidence and causation rules. Toxic tort liti-
gation typically requires costly expert testimony and technical evi-
dence. The problems with delay (loss of witnesses, information and,
perhaps, parties) that usually result from the long latency periods of
injury manifestation add to the extremely high transaction costs. 69
By allowing plaintiffs to pool their resources, class treatment can
overcome some of the practical obstacles to fair litigation.
One of the most expansive classes of toxic tort plaintiffs was certi-
fied in the "Agent Orange" products liability litigation.70 Judge
Weinstein recognized the desirability of class treatment in that case
because of the potential size of the plaintiff class, the likelihood that
a single class-wide determination on the issue of causation would
bring the issue to the attention of federal policymakers, and the pos-
sibility of encouraging settlement. 7' In certifying the class under
23(b)(3), 72 he undertook a "pragmatic" evaluation of whether com-
mon questions of law or fact predominated over questions affecting
only individual class members. 73 Weinstein found that the "general
causation" issue and common defenses were likely to be "applicable
to the plaintiffs' class as a whole." 74 Furthermore, he conceded that
ordinarily the "need to apply the law of dozens of different states
68. The "limited fund" problem calls for 23(b)(1)(B) certification to protect against
adjudications which would "substantially impair or impede" the ability of others to re-
cover. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee note to 1966 amendment. See
also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) (recognizing
the drawbacks of "overkill" as multiple punitive damages that may bankrupt a corporate
defendant and continuous and repeated punishment for the same error that may not be
appropriate).
69. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 909; Note, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions:
A Step Toward Equity and Efftiency, supra note 47, at 1187; Note, Common Law Liability for
Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, supra note 7, at 923, 925.
70. Agent Orange H, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417
(1984).
71. Id.
72. The court certified a 23(b)(1)(B) class on the issue of punitive damages and a
23(b)(3) class on all other issues.
73. Agent Orange II, 100 F.R.D. 718, 722 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417
(1984).
74. General causation included the defense that "the substances manufactured could
not have caused the injuries claimed." In addition, the plaintiffs "indicated that there
[were] a number of types of injuries which Agent Orange allegedly caused," a further
impetus to certify a class on the causation issue. Id. at 723.
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would preclude certification. ' 75 However, there was in this case a
"consensus among the states with respect to the rules of conflicts
and applicable substantive law that provide[d], in effect, a national
substantive rule .... "76
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to compel
Weinstein to vacate the certification order.77 The appellate court,
however, expressed skepticism as to both the existence of a "na-
tional substantive rule" 78 and the significance of the issue of "gen-
eral causation." 79
A federal cause of action for damages resulting from the disposal
of hazardous substances would eliminate the need for courts to take
similar "pragmatic" approaches in applying Rule 23 to such actions.
These suits would invariably involve common questions of federal
law, including questions of liability and defenses, that would permit
the use of class actions. Moreover, a uniform federal standard
would reduce the need for separation of issues under subdivision
(c)(4).
II. Conclusion
Toxic tort litigation will undoubtedly increase as more individuals
become aware of the injuries they may have suffered as a result of
their proximity to hazardous waste dumps. These suits are likely to
involve numerous plaintiffs and defendants. Traditional tort doc-
trines have been unsatisfactory in achieving "just, speedy and inex-
pensive" determinations of these actions. There is a need for
innovative approaches to the management of such cases. One such
approach would be the adoption of a federal uniform cause of action
for injuries resulting from the disposal of hazardous substances.
This would render more workable the class action and the other
procedural devices commonly used by the federal courts to achieve
judicial economy and efficiency in complex litigation.
AlisonJ. Freeman
75. Id. at 724.
76. Id.
77. In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984).
78. Id. at 861. Judge Weinstein himself later commented that "the probability of
appeal and possible reversal or modification" of his theory of a "national consensus
substantive law" was "substantial, making settlement more appropriate." In re "Agent
Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
79. In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F. 2d 858, 860 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984).
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